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It has become increasingly popular to suggest that expressivists should embrace 
some kind of conceptual role semantics (Blackburn 2006; Horwich 2010; 
Gibbard 2012; Bâve 2013; Köhler 2017; Chrisman 2017; Sinclair 2018; Brown 
2019). According to expressivism, normative concepts are fundamentally 
explained not in terms of what they refer to, but by their action-guiding role in 
practical deliberation. According to conceptual role semantics, concepts in 
general are fundamentally explained not in terms of what they refer to, but by 
their role in reasoning, deliberation, and belief formation. Insofar as conceptual 
role semantics provides an independently attractive framework for explaining 
meaning and content, it might therefore seem that expressivists would do well 
to embrace it, especially given the challenges that expressivists traditionally face 
providing a theory of meaning for normative concepts. This paper examines the 
general prospects for conceptual role expressivism, expressivist theories that 
embrace conceptual role semantics.  
It has two main aims. The first aim is to provide a general characterisation of 
the view (section 1). Although a number of expressivists explicitly endorse 
conceptual role semantics for normative concepts, there is no agreement on 
what form this should take. The general characterisation provided here aims to 
abstract away from the details of these accounts to provide a unified view that 
deserves the general title of conceptual role expressivism. The second aim is to 
raise a challenge for the general view (section 2). The challenge is to explain why 
normative concepts are not a species of defective concepts, where defective 
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concepts are those that cannot meaningfully embed and participate in genuine 
inference. The challenge arises because normative concepts as conceived by 
expressivism bear a number of similarities to concepts that plausibly are 
defective. The remainder of the paper is then devoted to examining responses 
to the challenge. After rejecting existing attempts to answer the challenge 
(section 3), I propose an alternative solution (section 4). However, the solution 
leaves conceptual role expressivism a less distinctive and interesting position 
than its proponents claim. I therefore conclude that we should be sceptical about 
how much expressivists gain by appealing to conceptual role semantics. 
 
1. The view 
 
‘Conceptual role semantics’ means many things to many people. As I will be 
using the term, conceptual role semantics is a framework for theorising about 
mental content. It explains what it is for a mental state to have a particular content 
in terms of the particular role that mental state plays in cognition, where this 
may include its role in processes of reasoning, belief formation, and practical 
deliberation. The particular role that constitutively individuates a concept or a 
thought is its conceptual role.  
For instance, a conceptual role account of the concept AND might characterise 
it as that concept & to possess which a subject is disposed or committed to 
making the following inferences: p, q ® p&q; p&q ® p; p&q ® q (e.g. Peacocke 
1992). And a conceptual role account of the concept RED might characterise it as 
that concept R to possesses which a subject is disposed or committed to 
accepting thoughts of the form Ra in the presence of red things in normal 
conditions (e.g. Horwich 1998). Thus, a conceptual role account of some concept 
will individuate that concept in terms of its possession conditions, where these 
specify certain conditions under which a subject accepts contents involving that 
concept. These conditions might specify transitions to or from other states of 
acceptance (e.g. AND), transitions from input-states such as perceptual states or 
worldly states of affairs (e.g. RED), or transitions to output-states such as actions 
or conative states (e.g. OUGHT¾more on which below). 
The above characterisation of conceptual role semantics is only 
programmatic, and there are many different ways in which to develop such a 
theory.1 For example, in developing a conceptual role theory for some concept, 
 
1 Prominent examples include Harman (1973); Field (1977); Block (1986); Peacocke (1992); 
Horwich (1998). Following most expressivists, I will assume throughout the relative priority of 
thought over language, and so I will not examine conceptual role theories that primarily apply 
to (public) linguistic meaning, e.g. Sellars (1953); Brandom (1994). 
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there are a number of choice points that one must make with respect to cashing 
out the conceptual roles in question:2 
 
• Concept-first vs thought-first. Do conceptual roles primarily apply to 
concepts, the constituents of thoughts, or to entire thoughts? 
• Subjectivist vs objectivist. Are concepts and thoughts concrete mental 
representations or abstract propositional contents?3 
• Naturalism vs normativism. Do conceptual roles specify transitions that 
subjects are disposed to make, or that subjects ought to make or are 
rationally committed to making? 
• Atomism vs holism. Do concepts have core or essential conceptual roles, or 
are conceptual roles locally or globally holistic?  
• Solipsistic vs communitarian. Are individuals the locus of conceptual roles, 
or communities? 
• Narrow vs wide. Do conceptual roles specify transitions only between 
mental states, or also between mental states and worldly objects, 
properties, events, states of affairs, etc. 
• Doxastic vs non-doxastic. Do narrow conceptual roles specify transitions 
only between doxastic states, or also between non-doxastic states? 
 
Given the wide variety of views that might result depending on how one 
answers these questions, this shows that conceptual role semantics is best 
understood as a framework or general approach to theorising rather than a 
particular theory or thesis.  
As with conceptual role semantics, ‘expressivism’ means many things to 
many people. As I will be using the term, expressivism is any approach to 
explaining normative thought and discourse that accepts the following two 
claims. First, that normative thought and discourse is non-descriptive, or non-
representational, in the sense that normative judgments and assertions do not aim 
to describe or represent some distinctively normative part of reality (call this 
non-descriptivism). Second, that normative thought and discourse is in some 
sense directive or practical, where this is typically cashed out in terms of the role 
that normative judgments and assertions play in motivating actions and 
coordinating attitudes (call this practicality). An expressivist account of 
normative concepts will therefore explain normative concepts not in terms of 
 
2 Compare Whiting (2006); Chrisman (2017); Sinclair (2018). While the following choice points 
are logically distinct, they will interact in a number of ways, making certain combinations more 
or less plausible. 
3 This distinction isn’t exhaustive, but other views in the ontology of concepts are less obviously 
compatible with conceptual role semantics. 
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what they represent, but rather in terms of their directive or practical role in 
one’s cognitive economy.4 Given that conceptual role semantics explains 
concepts in general in terms of their role in a subject’s cognitive economy, it is 
therefore worth asking if it is profitable to think of expressivism as a kind of 
conceptual role semantics for normative concepts. If we think that conceptual 
role semantics is an independently attractive framework for explaining mental 
content, then one might hope that adopting this framework will provide 
expressivists with the resources they need to adequately explain normative 
concepts. 
More precisely, then, conceptual role expressivism can be defined as any 
conceptual role account of normative concepts that respects non-descriptivism 
and practicality. Although specific accounts will vary, both in terms of the 
choice points above as well the details of the conceptual roles for different 
normative concepts, I propose that conceptual role expressivism is characterised 
by the following three commitments: 
 
(A) Conceptual roles for normative concepts do not specify any input 
conditions that mention or implicate normative properties, relations, or 
states of affairs. 
(B) Conceptual roles for normative concepts specify some essential 
connection to conative or affective states. 
(C) Conceptual roles for normative concepts do not determine robustly 
representational content for normative thoughts. 
 
To clarify, the claim is not that (A), (B), and (C) are sufficient conditions on a 
concept’s being normative. As we will see below, there are concepts that respect 
these commitments that are not normative concepts. Rather, the claim is that for 
any conceptual role account of normative concepts, these commitments are 
necessary and jointly sufficient for that account being expressivist. Below, I will 
show how existing versions of conceptual role expressivism go about meeting 
these constraints. However, first some general comments on each.  
Commitment (A) is necessary to respect non-descriptivism. According to 
non-descriptivism, in deploying a normative concept, one is not responding to 
normative reality. While many contemporary expressivists embrace the 
existence of normative properties, relations, and states of affairs in a minimal or 
quasi-realist sense, all expressivists deny that such properties, relations, or 
states of affairs play any explanatory role in their account of normative concepts. 
As such, they will not play any explanatory role in an account of their possession 
 
4 Prominent examples include Blackburn (1998); Gibbard (2003); Horgan and Timmons (2006); 
Schroeder (2008); Ridge (2014).  
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conditions. This is not to deny that subjects do in fact respond to features of 
reality when deploying normative concepts. But there is no distinctive domain 
of reality that all subjects must respond to in order to possess normative concepts, 
according to expressivists. Among other things, this is meant to explain how 
different subjects can systematically respond to different features of reality in 
applying a normative concept without thereby employing distinct concepts. 
Thus, for example, two subjects might have radically divergent conceptions of 
what constitutes the subject matter of moral wrongness, for example a Kantian 
who thinks it is wrong to violate the categorical imperative and a moral egoist 
who thinks it is wrong for anyone to not pursue their own self-interest. These 
two subjects will respond to distinct aspects of reality in applying the concept 
MORALLY WRONG, but they still seem to disagree about what is wrong. 
Consequently, expressivist conceptual roles for normative terms will be narrow 
in scope.  
Commitment (B) is meant to capture whatever it is that expressivists want to 
claim is the distinctive function or purpose of normative concepts in our 
cognitive economy and interpersonal discourse. Traditionally, expressivists 
have endorsed some form of motivational internalism, which claims that there 
is some kind of necessary connection between normative judgments and being 
motivated to act in accordance with those judgments. On the present approach, 
this can be cashed out in terms of normative concepts involving constitutive 
conceptual connections between normative judgments and desires, intentions, 
or other action-guiding states. Expressivists might also claim that normative 
concepts are conceptually linked to affective states as well, such as certain 
reactive attitudes. Plausibly, different normative concepts will be linked to 
different kinds of attitude, and there may be many different candidates for the 
same normative concept. The general point is that normative concepts are 
distinctive in their connections to non-doxastic attitudes. This also suggests a 
more atomistic or at least locally holistic approach to characterising normative 
conceptual roles, though (B) remains compatible with a more global holism. 
However, I will assume for simplicity that normative thoughts and concepts 
have a core conceptual role. 
Commitment (C) is essential because a meta-normative descriptivist might 
accept (A) and (B) while retaining a robustly representationalist conception of 
normative thought, i.e. one in which normative concepts purport to denote 
normative properties or relations and normative thoughts purport to describe 
normative states of affairs (e.g. Wedgwood 2007¾more on which below). This 
is because conceptual role theorists typically hold that conceptual role in some 
sense determines content, and an orthodox reading of this claim is that the 
conceptual role of a mental state determines its representational content. Because 
expressivists deny that normative concepts are representational in this sense, 
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the conceptual role expressivist must respect commitment (C). Typically, this is 
secured by accepting some kind of minimalist or deflationary conception of 
content, though we will see below that there are other ways of respecting (C). 
However, one might accept (C) while rejecting expressivism, for instance if one 
accepted a global deflationism about content as well as some kind of meta-
normative descriptivism. Hence, both (A) and (C) are necessary to respect non-
descriptivism.5 
Here ends the general characterisation of conceptual role expressivism. In the 
remainder of this section, I examine three different versions of expressivist 
theories that explicitly embrace conceptual role semantics and explain how each 
version adheres to commitments (A), (B), and (C). I choose these particular 
theories as I take them to be representative examples of expressivist views that 
explicitly embrace conceptual role semantics. For ease of exposition, I have 
regimented the terminology to that used above.  
The first example comes from Horwich (2010), who holds that to believe a 
proposition p is to accept a sentence that expresses p, where acceptance involves 
relying on that sentence in theoretical and practical reasoning. Horwich argues 
that the meaning-constituting property of a word is its property of having some 
core conceptual role. This core conceptual role, together with other factors such 
as the environment and the meaning-constituting roles of other words, explain 
when sentences containing the word are accepted and rejected (hence for 
Horwich, conceptual roles are concept-first, subjectivist, naturalist, and solipsistic). 
Thus, on this view, the propositional content of a belief is determined by the 
meaning-constituting properties of the components of its sentential object, 
together with its syntactic structure. Because Horwich denies that the meaning-
constituting properties of words are relations between those words and what 
they stand for, he denies that any meaning-constituting properties determine a 
robustly representational content. Hence, his view respects commitment (C) by 
being globally non-representationalist. As an initial approximation, he then 
proposes the following conceptual role for the ‘ought’ of practical rationality 
(2010: 188): 
 
 S believes that they ought to do X « S is strongly inclined to do X  
S denies that they ought to do X « S is not inclined to do X  
 
 
5 An important part of this account is that (C) is a substantive and independent commitment. 
Kalderon (2005) examines and rejects a number of arguments that try to derive something like 
(C) from something like (A) and (B). However, if (C) is an independent commitment motivated 
on independent grounds, then such argument do not speak against conceptual role 
expressivism. 
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(Throughout, I use arrow notation to specify the transitions between mental 
states constitutive of the conceptual role in question.) Hence, Horwich’s view 
respects both (A) and (B), as the core conceptual role for the ought of practical 
rationality does not specify any input conditions and is constitutively connected 
to an action-guiding attitude. 
The next example comes from Köhler (2017). Köhler aims to provide a 
deflationary account of propositional content by providing an account of the 
non-representational function of content attributions that does not invoke any 
entities as the referents of ‘that’-clauses. In a nutshell, Köhler’s idea is that the 
sentence mentioned in a ‘that’-clause serves as an illustrative example of certain 
“basic explanatory properties” of the belief being attributed (2017: 198). 
Specifically, the sentence’s semantic properties allow it to serve as an illustrative 
example of the belief’s conceptual role, where Köhler understands this as the 
subset of its total causal-functional role that relates to perceptual, inferential, 
and action-producing processes (hence for Köhler, conceptual roles are thought-
first, naturalist, and solipsistic). Declarative sentences are then understood as 
codifying information about the conceptual role of the belief state they express. 
By explaining the role of content attributions without appealing to contents, 
Köhler’s account is committed to (C). He then proposes that representational 
states are those whose conceptual roles include sensory input conditions but no 
direct relation to action production, and that conative states are those whose 
conceptual roles include no sensory input conditions but directly relate to action 
production. Although Köhler offers no specific conceptual roles for normative 
mental states, he suggests that normative judgments are conative states in the 
above sense. Hence, the account respects commitments (A) and (B). However, 
these conative states are nonetheless belief states in virtue of their having 
sufficiently rich inferential transitions to and from other belief states.  
The final example comes from Sinclair (2018), who proposes that 
expressivists adopt the following conceptual role for the concept X IS ALL-THINGS-
CONSIDERED BETTER FOR ME TO DO AT T THAN Y (hereafter BETTER) as that concept B 
such that: 
 
CRBETTER S accepts B(x,y,me,t) ® S has conditional intention to do x rather 
than y at t.6 
 
If CRBETTER is the conceptual role for the normative concept B, it should be clear 
that it respects commitments (A) and (B). Sinclair then argues that by endorsing 
a deflationary view of truth-conditional content, we avoid any kind of view 
 
6 This conceptual role is taken from Wedgwood (2001). 
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according to which CRBETTER determines a robust normative property or relation 
as the referent of B. Sinclair’s view therefore also respects (C). 
I will return to each of these theories in a little more detail below. The point 
here is that despite their differences, at the core of each view is the idea that 
normative concepts are individuated by their non-representational, practical, 
core conceptual roles. As such, each view respects the defining commitments of 
conceptual role expressivism. Although these three examples by no means 
exhaust all possible versions of conceptual role expressivism, they nonetheless 
provide recent examples of expressivist views that make explicit appeal to 
conceptual role semantics. Moreover, given the wide variety of differing choice 
points, they show how different versions of conceptual role expressivism can 
respect these commitments in theoretically diverse ways. In the next section I 
will raise a challenge to conceptual role expressivism. Because I take the 




2. The challenge  
 
Let a candidate concept be defective just in case it cannot meaningfully embed in 
complex thoughts and participate in genuine inference. The challenge for 
conceptual role expressivism is to explain why normative concepts are not a 
species of defective concepts. The challenge arises because normative concepts 
as conceived by conceptual role expressivism bear a number of similarities to 
other concepts that plausibly are defective. I will argue that without any 
explanation of why normative concepts are not defective, expressivists must 
accept either (i) that normative concepts are also defective, or (ii) that plausibly 
defective concepts are in fact not defective. While perhaps early emotivists 
might happily accept (i) (Ayer sometimes describes moral concepts as ‘proto-
concepts’), both claims are problematic. So expressivists need to explain why 
normative concepts are not defective. Before providing some examples of 
defective concepts, however, let me say something more about what it is for a 
concept to be defective.  
First, I am only here concerned with defectiveness in the narrow sense 
defined above. There are, of course, a number of other ways in which a concept 
might be described as “defective”, but these will not be examined here. Second, 
it is important to distinguish between the property of being defective and the 
explanation for why a concept is or is not defective. In targeting the phenomenon, 
I do not wish to presuppose any particular explanation of what makes concepts 
defective. Third, depending on one’s view of concepts, one might maintain that 
a “defective concept” is in fact no concept at all. That is, one might think that 
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the class of concepts is not divided into those which are defective and those 
which are not. Rather, on this view, the capacity to participate in inference and 
embedding is a necessary condition for something’s being a concept in the first 
place¾a “concept” that lacks this capacity is a spurious concept. If this is right, 
the challenge for conceptual role expressivism is to explain why normative 
conceptual roles successfully individuate any concept whatsoever. While the 
correct formulation of the challenge is a substantive issue, the arguments 
discussed below apply mutatis mutandis to either formulation.7 For ease of 
exposition and to keep the challenge as general as possible, I will continue to 
talk about defective concepts without taking a stand on whether defective 
concepts are genuine concepts that have the property of being defective, or 
whether they are spurious concepts, descriptions of which are merely a façon de 
parler and not ontologically committing. 
With these qualifications out the way, I will now provide two examples of 
defective concepts. The main focus of the challenge will be the second example, 
but it will be helpful to first examine a more familiar one. The classic example 
comes from Prior’s (1960) ‘tonk’ connective. Transposing Prior’s example from 
the linguistic to the conceptual mode, suppose we define TONK as that concept T 
to possess which a subject S is disposed or committed to making the following 
transitions involving arbitrary propositions p and q:  
 
CRTONK S accepts p ® S accepts pTq 
S accepts pTq ® S accepts q 
 
We can think of TONK as a kind of logical connective. CRTONK provides 
introduction and elimination rules for TONK in a similar manner to other logical 
connectives. However, it apparently follows from CRTONK that anyone who 
possesses the concept TONK can derive any arbitrary proposition from any other 
arbitrary proposition. But this is absurd. Perhaps there is some loose sense of 
‘inference’ such that one could ‘derive’ q from p via TONK in that one can 
recognise the rules that individuate TONK and consciously follow the rules that 
lead from p to q. But this weak sense of recognising and following the rules 
specified by CRTONK is not plausibly sufficient for one to genuinely infer 
anything using TONK. So despite having a well-defined conceptual role, TONK is 
a defective concept.8  
 
7 This issue might turn on whether one accepts a subjectivist or objectivist ontology of concepts. 
8 Warren (2015) argues that ‘tonk’ is not defective; rather, it simply renders the language in 
which it is introduced trivial. However, because I understand conceptual role semantics as a 
view of mental content rather than language, Warren’s arguments cannot be straightforwardly 
applied here. In any case, ‘p’ and ‘q’ in CRTONK quantify over arbitrary propositions, not sentences 
of a language. For this reason, TONK as defined here does not result in triviality. 
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The important lesson here is that not just any conceptual role can be 
genuinely meaning-constituting. Call such a view unrestricted conceptual role 
semantics. The standard response to Prior’s example is to embrace some kind of 
restricted conceptual role semantics, where the basic idea is to introduce 
additional constraints on which conceptual roles are genuinely meaning-
constituting (e.g. Belnap 1962). We’ll return to this distinction below. However, 
I’ll leave aside any further discussion of TONK for two reasons. First, insofar as 
TONK presents a problem for conceptual role expressivism, it is because it 
presents a problem for conceptual role semantics in general, which I’m not here 
calling into question. Second, as a candidate logical connective, TONK differs in 
important ways to normative concepts as conceived by conceptual role 
expressivism. Specifically, I will argue below that the distinctive commitments 
of conceptual role expressivism raise problems quite different to those raised by 
TONK. If correct, this means that standard responses to TONK will not answer the 
challenge for conceptual role expressivism of defective concepts. So with a 
firmer grasp of the notion of a defective concept, let us now proceed to our 
second example.  
The second example is a variant of Dreier’s (1996) ‘hiyo’ predicate. I will first 
introduce the example as Drier presents it and then go on to explain its relevance 
to conceptual role expressivism. Suppose we use the word ‘hiyo’ to perform the 
speech act of accosting. Thus, by uttering ‘Hiyo, Bob!’ in Bob’s presence, I thereby 
accost Bob. We might say that the meaning of ‘hiyo’ is constituted by this use. 
But this use does not constitute a meaning for ‘hiyo’ that allows it to 
meaningfully embed or participate in inference. For starters, ‘hiyo’-sentences 
are not declaratives, so ‘hiyo’ lacks the necessary syntactic properties. However, 
this does not get to the heart of the matter. To see why, suppose we introduce 
the predicate ‘is hiyo’ whose meaning is constituted by our using the predicate 
to accost whatever it is predicated of. Thus, by uttering ‘Bob is hiyo’ in Bob’s 
presence, I thereby accost Bob in virtue of the meaning of the sentence uttered. 
‘Hiyo’-sentences are syntactically well-formed. However, it is implausible that 
they can thereby meaningfully embed and participate in genuine inference. 
Plausibly, we have no conception of what a sentence like ‘If Bob is hiyo, then a 
Dingo is near’ means. So even if ‘hiyo’-sentences are syntactically well-formed, 
its meaning-constituting use is not such to allow ‘hiyo’ to meaningfully embed 
and participate in genuine inference. As with ‘tonk’, ‘hiyo’ seems to provide a 
counterexample to a certain kind of unrestricted use-theoretic meta-semantics. 
It might initially seem that conceptual role expressivism is isolated from 
Dreier’s example. Conceptual role expressivism explains normative concepts in 
terms of certain transitions between mental states involving those concepts. By 
contrast, ‘hiyo’ is explained in terms of its performative role. As such, there is 
no reason to think that ‘hiyo’ expresses any concept whatsoever.  
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Granting this, however, it is easy to construct an example that mirrors 
Dreier’s but is formulated at the level of concepts rather than predicates. For 
instance, let HIYO be that concept H to possess which a subject S is disposed or 
committed to accepting the following transitions: 
 
CRHIYO S wants to accost x ® S accepts Hx 
 S does not want to accost x ® S rejects Hx 
 
So just as one would utter the sentence ‘Bob is hiyo’ if one wanted to accost Bob, 
if one possesses the concept HIYO, then one is disposed or committed accepting 
the thought BOB IS HIYO when one has a desire to accost Bob. CRHIYO provides 
clearly defined acceptance and rejection rules for when to accept and reject HIYO-
thoughts. However, just as we have no conception of what the sentence ‘If Bob 
is hiyo, then a dingo is near’ means, we surely have no grasp of the thought IF 
BOB IS HIYO THEN A DINGO IS NEAR. Nor is it plausible that we could genuinely infer 
that a dingo is near from Bob being hiyo. So despite having a well-defined 
conceptual role, HIYO is a defective concept.9 
HIYO presents a challenge because the conceptual role for HIYO bears a strong 
resemblance to the conceptual roles of normative concepts as conceived by 
conceptual role expressivism. After all, CRHIYO does not obviously specify any 
input conditions that implicate hiyo properties, relations, or states of affairs. It 
specifies an essential connection to conative states. And it does not obviously 
determine any kind of robustly representational content for HIYO-thoughts. 
We’ll see below that things are a little more complicated than this initial 
comparison suggests. But hopefully the similarity to normative concepts is clear 
enough. The important point is that if HIYO is defective, then given the similarity, 
conceptual role expressivists owe us an explanation of why normative concepts 
are not defective. Assuming, that is, expressivists wish to vindicate our 





In this section, I examine and reject some possible responses to the challenge. 
 
 
9 It has been suggested to me that the conceptual analogue of Dreier’s ‘hiyo’ predicate is better 
thought of as a kind of mental accosting that one performs in thought. However, I’m sceptical 
that any such act exists. We might utter the words ‘Hiyo, Bob’ in thought, so to speak, while 
thinking of Bob in some way or other, perhaps imagining Bob as the addressee of our thought. 
But I see no sense in which this is genuinely an act of accosting. 
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3.1 Everyone’s problem? 
 
Insofar as HIYO presents a challenge to conceptual role expressivism, one might 
wonder whether this is because it presents a challenge to conceptual role 
semantics in general. More generally, it seems, any version of conceptual role 
semantics should provide some account of the difference between conceptual 
roles that bestow genuine meaning and those that do not. So one might think 
that the conceptual role expressivist is no worse off than any other conceptual 
role theorist. And although this would certainly count against conceptual role 
expressivism at the end of the day, my aim here is to assess whether 
expressivists would do well to adopt some form of conceptual role semantics 
insofar as it is an independently attractive framework. I am therefore bracketing 
questions about the overall viability of conceptual role semantics. 
The problem with this response is that descriptivist conceptual role theories 
do have a way of answering the challenge. In the present context, we can think 
of descriptivist theories as providing a particular kind of restricted conceptual 
role semantics. Specifically, that for a conceptual role to be meaning-
constituting, it has to fix a unique determinate reference for the concept it 
characterises. In other words, only conceptual roles that determine robustly 
representational content are meaning-constituting. In the remainder of this 
section, I’ll explain how a descriptivist approach developed by Peacocke (1992) 
and Wedgwood (2007) can answer the challenge. Although the approach is 
unavailable to expressivists, its general structure will pave the way for the 
alternative solution proposed in section 4, so it will be worth dwelling on in a 
little more detail. 
According to Peacocke and Wedgwood, any theory of possession conditions 
for a concept must be supplemented with a determination theory that explains 
how the reference of a concept is determined by its conceptual role. Among 
other things, a determination theory is meant to rationalise the transitions 
specified by a conceptual role, in that it explains why it is in a certain sense 
appropriate or correct for a subject to make those transitions. On this approach, if 
no suitable determination theory for a concept can be given, then the transitions 
specified by the conceptual role cannot be appropriately rationalised, meaning 
that the concept is defective. Peacocke and Wedgwood develop this idea in 
slightly different ways, so I will take each in turn. 
For Peacocke (1992), a determination theory for a concept fixes that concept’s 
reference by making the belief-forming practices mentioned in its conceptual 
role result in true beliefs and by making the inferences mentioned truth-
preserving. Thus, suppose AND is that concept & to possess which a subject S 
finds the following inferences primitively compelling (i.e. not answerable to nor 
derivable from anything else): 
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CRAND S accepts p and S accepts q ® S accepts p&q 
 S accepts p&q ® S accepts p 
 S accepts p&q ® S accepts q 
 
Given its conceptual role, the determination theory for AND assigns as the 
reference of AND whatever makes the transitions mentioned in CRAND truth-
preserving¾here the classical truth function of conjunction (Peacocke 1992: 18). 
Thus, it is rational to follow CRAND because one preserves truth in one’s beliefs 
by doing so.  
On this view, a concept is defective if there is no determination theory that 
makes the transitions specified by its conceptual role truth-preserving or a true-
belief-forming practice. This is arguably true of TONK (Peacocke 1992: 21).10 
However, expressivists deny that conceptual roles for normative concepts 
involve forming reliably true beliefs or making valid inferences. Instead, they 
claim that the possession conditions for normative concepts are exhausted by 
their role in guiding action. So this explanation of defectiveness will be of no use 
to expressivists.   
Although no expressivist, Wedgwood (2007) also maintains that the 
possession conditions for normative concepts are exhausted by their action-
guiding role. He therefore requires a broader conception than Peacocke of the 
role of a determination theory. For the ‘ought’ of all-things-considered practical 
normativity, Wedgwood (2007: 97) proposes that OUGHT is that concept O to 
possess which a subject is rationally committed to the following: 
 
CROUGHT S accepts the first-person proposition O<me, t>(p) ® S makes p part of 
S’s ideal plan about what to do at t. 
 
Here, one’s ideal plan is what would be one’s plan if it were not affected by 
ignorance and uncertainty about what to do in the situation one is in at t; to 
make p part of one’s plan is to adopt a plan that entails p. Because plans are not 
truth-apt, the correctness of the transition cannot be explained in terms of truth-
preservation from the belief to the plan.11 
Instead of truth, Wedgwood (2007: 100) appeals to the “point” or “purpose” 
of the attitudes in question and to the corresponding rational norms that govern 
 
10 If ‘tonk’ were trivial, this need not be true¾see fn.8. 
11 Although some might argue that plans are truth-apt, a determination theory that assigns a 
semantic value to OUGHT based on the truth-preservation from the belief to the plan would 
assign quite a different semantic value to that of our actual concept, and so A(O) would 
plausibly individuate a distinct concept if we took its correctness conditions to consist in truth-
preservation. 
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them. Thus, while “getting things right” in believing is having a true belief, 
getting things right in planning consists in something else, such as having 
“genuinely choiceworthy” plans (ibid: 101). Wedgwood then argues that if being 
genuinely choiceworthy is what governs our plans, then the determination 
theory for CROUGHT should assign to O the logically weakest property of a 
proposition in virtue of which it is correct to make that proposition a part of 
one’s ideal plan. Thus whereas Peacocke’s theory predicts that O is defective, 
Wedgwood’s theory does not. At least, it does not insofar as there is some 
property in virtue of which it is correct to make a proposition a part of one’s 
ideal plan. 
Is there any semantic assignment for HIYO that would rationalise CRHIYO? I can 
see two possible ways of answering this question. The first simply maintains 
that there are no relevant norms governing our desires to accost people and our 
beliefs about who is hiyo that would determine a semantic assignment for HIYO. 
If this is correct, then Wedgwood’s theory predicts that HIYO is defective¾there 
is nothing it could refer to that would rationalise CRHIYO. The second answer is 
that we can provide a determination theory for HIYO, but one that shows HIYO to 
be quite different to how we originally conceived it to be. To provide such a 
theory, we can first note that one “gets things right” in believing that x is hiyo 
when one desires to accost x. Given that this is a transition to a belief, we can 
ask what property would make this process a true belief-forming practice? Well, 
presumably the property of my desiring to accost x. Thus, on this account, HIYO 
turns out to be an ordinary descriptive concept. If this is correct, then HIYO is 
actually not a defective concept, but our explanation for why it is not defective 
is unproblematic. And, importantly for our purposes, it in no way helps the 
expressivist to explain why normative concepts aren’t defective, because the 
same explanation is not available for normative concepts as conceived by 
expressivism. 
My aim here has not been to claim that these explanations are correct or 
without problems of their own. Rather, it has been to show that there are 
existing strategies for dealing with defective concepts that make reference to the 
representational properties of concepts. Because expressivists deny that 
normative concepts are representational in this sense, they cannot pursue this 
strategy in any form. So the challenge to explain defective concepts is 
particularly pressing for expressivists. They must look elsewhere. 
 
3.2 Deflationary responses 
 
Each version of conceptual role expressivism examined above embraces some 
kind of minimalism or deflationism about content. One might therefore wonder 
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whether there is some kind of deflationary response to the challenge available. 




Sinclair does not acknowledge the problem of defective concepts. But he does 
acknowledge the need for a determination theory in order to account for certain 
platitudes about how the content of a thought is determined by the contents of 
its component parts. In order to avoid descriptivism, Sinclair instead proposes 
a “deflationary determination theory”. This begins with the observation that the 
truth conditions of a thought can be given by the deflationary scheme: the 
thought Fx is true iff x is F. Given this, he then argues (2018: 110): 
 
The semantic value of the predicative concept F is its contribution it 
makes to the truth-conditions of the thoughts in which it appears. Then, 
we can say, for a thought of the form {x is ...}, the contribution made by a 
predicative concept F, when substituted into the ‘...’ position, is to 
generate a sentence which is true iff. x is F. So F makes the following 
contribution to truth-values: it generates a thought which is true when 
applied to things that are F and a thought that is false when applied to 
things that are not F (note the disquoting here). Since ‘semantic value’ is 
just contribution to truth-conditions, this is F’s (deflationary) semantic 
value: the semantic value of F is the set of F-things. 
 
Lest this account sound overly referential, Sinclair assures us that it is not 
because it does not necessitate that predicative concepts refer to robust worldly 
properties.  
For the sake of argument, let’s grant that Sinclair’s proposal is suitably 
deflationary and captures all the relevant platitudes. The question is whether it 
can explain defectiveness. It seems to me that it cannot. First, deflationary 
semantic notions cannot play any explanatory role in a theory of meaning or 
content. Therefore, they cannot play a role in explaining defectiveness. To 
illustrate this point, recall that Sinclair endorses: 
 
CRBETTER S accepts B(x,y,me,t) ® S has conditional intention to do x rather 
than y at t. 
 
If the semantic value of a predicative concept is its extension, then the semantic 
value of B is the set of tuples <x,y,me,t> that generate true thoughts when taken 
as the argument of B. However, on Sinclair’s view, there is no robust worldly 
property or relation that explains why the members of this set generate true 
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thoughts when taken as the argument of B. Thus, given Sinclair’s deflationism, 
there is nothing in virtue of which this set generates true thoughts. 
Consequently, there is nothing in virtue of which this semantic value 
rationalises CRBETTER. 
Instead, the resulting view looks like a version of unrestricted conceptual role 
semantics. For there is nothing to rule out providing a deflationary 
determination theory for concepts like HIYO. Recall: 
 
CRHIYO S wants to accost x  ® S accepts Hx 
 S does not want to accost x ® S rejects Hx 
 
If the reference of a predicative concept is its extension, then the extension of H 
will be the set of H-things, i.e. the set of individuals that determine a true 
thought when H is applied to them. There is no worldly property of being hiyo 
that explains why the members of this set generates true thoughts when taken 
as the argument of H. But neither is there a worldly relation of being better than. 
BETTER and HIYO are on all fours. So Sinclair’s deflationary determination theory 
lacks the resources to explain why normative concepts are non-defective and 




Because Köhler endorses a thought-first version of conceptual role theory 
according to which whole thoughts are primary rather than their constituents, 
the challenge will take a slightly different form. On this view, the challenge can 
be reformulated in terms of explaining what distinguishes defective mental 
states from non-defective mental states. Specifically, the class of mental states 
characterised by a concept F can be individuated as those mental states 
conventionally expressed by atomic ‘F’-sentences. This is because on Köhler’s 
view, sentences provide illustrative examples of the core functional roles of the 
mental states they conventionally express. The challenge of defective concepts 
is then to explain why the mental states expressed by sentences of the form ‘S 
ought to do x’ are not defective whereas those expressed by sentences of the 
form ‘S is hiyo’ are defective.  
Like Sinclair, Köhler does not discuss the possibility of defective concepts or 
the challenge it might pose to conceptual role expressivism. However, it does 
not seem that his account has the resources to explain defective concepts. First, 
note how on Köhler’s account, logical and semantic relations between 
declarative sentences earn their keep in codifying functional relations between 
mental states that are expressed by such sentences. Next, note that it is surely 
possible that there could be a functionally defined state such that a subject comes 
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to accept Bob is hiyo on the basis of the subject’s desire to accost Bob, and which 
also causally interacts with other mental states that preserves the isomorphism 
of the ‘logical’ relations between ‘hiyo’-sentences and other sentences. If this is 
a genuine possibility, then ‘hiyo’ can meaningfully embed and participate in 
genuine inference just as much as any normative predicate. So Köhler’s account 




Recall that for Horwich, to believe that I ought to do x is to accept the sentence 
‘I ought to do x’. The challenge for Horwich is then to explain why we can 
genuinely accept ‘ought’-sentences but not ‘hiyo’-sentences. Unlike the 
previous two examples, Horwich does acknowledge the challenge from 
defective concepts. His solution is to introduce an additional constraint on 
acceptance that explains why HIYO is defective and why normative concepts are 
not.  
To identify the relevant constraint, Horwich begins with the observation that 
when one person genuinely accepts something and someone else accepts its 
negation, there is a disagreement: “there is conflict, a clash, a feeling that the other 
person is somehow in bad shape.” (2010: 182) This seems to be something 
lacking in the hiyo-case. Suppose I want to accost Bob and come to accept that 
Bob is hiyo. Next, suppose you do not want to accost Bob and come to accept 
that Bob is not hiyo. Given CRHIYO, we are both competent users of HIYO who 
have ‘correctly’ come to form our beliefs according to the meaning-constituting 
rules governing ‘hiyo’. However, it seems implausible to suppose that there is 
any real sense in which we disagree about whether Bob is hiyo. Perhaps if we’re 
walking together we might disagree over whether to accost to Bob. But the 
disagreement here seems to be in attitude or plan rather than in the belief itself. 
From this observation, Horwich then proposes that “the conflict associated with 
contradictory beliefs consists in their potential, through inference, to engender 
conflicting desires and decisions.” (2010: 183) Call this the disagreement 
constraint.  
Beliefs concerning taste aside, the disagreement constraint seems fairly 
plausible. The problem, however, is that constraint is best explained by the 
inferential properties of beliefs and not the other way around. This is because 
any belief whatsoever can engender practical conflict given other suitable premises 
to reason from. Imagine the following scenario: (i) Sophie wants to accost George 
and so comes to accept that George is hiyo; (ii) Sophie has the bizarre belief that 
people that are hiyo demand a certain kind of respect where this involves 
frustrating the desires of those who believe of someone who is hiyo that they 
are not hiyo; (iii) David does not want to accost George and so comes to accept 
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that George is not hiyo. In this scenario, contradictory beliefs about whether 
George is hiyo engender conflicting desires and decisions in virtue of their 
capacity to participate in inference. So Horwich’s theory incorrectly predicts 
that we can genuinely accept ‘hiyo’-sentences. 
Of course, ‘hiyo’-sentences don’t actually engender practical conflict in this 
way. But that’s because ‘hiyo’-sentences cannot participate in genuine inference. 
Horwich’s proposal claims that a sentence can participate in genuine inference 
in virtue of its capacity to engender practical conflict when it and its negation 
are accepted. But the above example shows that this gets things the wrong way 
around. Rather, accepting a sentence and its negation can engender practical 
conflict in virtue of their capacity to participate in genuine inference. So 
Horwich’s account fails to explain why normative concepts are not defective 
and why HIYO is. All three deflationary accounts therefore fail to answer the 
challenge. 
 
3.3 Biting the bullet? 
 
I have assumed throughout that HIYO is a defective concept. All of the responses 
discussed above accept this assumption as a premise and try to explain the 
difference between HIYO and normative concepts. Could this assumption be 
challenged? In other words, could the conceptual role expressivist simply claim 
that HIYO, though weird, is not a defective concept? If this is right, then it’s at 
least not obvious that the expressivist faces any challenge explaining defective 
concepts, as the particular challenge for expressivism was motivated by the 
similarities between normative concepts and HIYO. 
We might develop this thought in the following way. First, suppose we adopt 
an inferentialist view of the logical connectives like the material conditional that 
says something like the following: to believe if p then q is to be committed to not 
accepting p while also rejecting q (compare Blackburn 1988). Given our account 
of what it is to accept and reject HIYO-thoughts, we arguably do have a 
conception of how HIYO can meaningfully embed and participate in genuine 
inference, at least for truth-functional connectives like the material conditional. 
Specifically, to accept an embedded HIYO-thought is to be committed to holding 
certain combinations of HIYO-thoughts and other attitudes.  
Further, we might provide a debunking explanation of the intuition that HIYO 
is a defective concept as follows. Perhaps HIYO seems weird simply because we 
are not HIYO-people. We do not possess any such concept and would have no 
use for one. This contrasts with normative concepts, which expressivists claim 
earn their keep in motivating actions and coordinating attitudes. However, just 
because it is hard to imagine a use for HIYO it does not follow that there is no 
possible use. Perhaps we can imagine a community which for some reason 
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attaches the utmost significance to people’s desires about who they accost. 
Surely such a community is possible, and it seems at least more plausible that 
they might have use for a HIYO-like concept. Arguably, therefore, HIYO is not 
defective. 
I think that there are at least three things that can be said in response to this 
line of argument. First, one might worry that embracing HIYO will overgeneralise 
the quasi-realist ambitions of most contemporary expressivists. Typically, 
contemporary expressivists aim to vindicate our talk about normative truth, 
facts, properties, and so on by providing deflationary interpretations of these 
notions.  However, if we accept that HIYO is on all fours with normative concepts, 
then we should expect to be able to provide similar interpretations of hiyo truth, 
facts, properties, and so on. Of course, we might not care to vindicate these 
notions, but it does not follow that such notions could not be vindicated by or on 
behalf of those (possible) subjects who possess the concept. However, that there 
are vindicatory explanations to be had of these notions seems much less 
plausible than for normative concepts. Perhaps one might reject expressivism’s 
quasi-realist ambitions, but I think this is a significant cost to those sympathetic 
to expressivism.  
Second, one might worry that the account of HIYO embedding provided above 
begs the question. The account relied on a certain view of logical connectives 
according to which to believe if p then q is to be committed to not accept p while 
rejecting q. The idea then was that we can straightforwardly explain hiyo-
embedding by substituting a ‘hiyo’-sentence in place of ‘p’ or ‘q’. However, this 
account presupposes that we can genuinely accept and reject HIYO-thoughts. But 
this is the very claim that needs to be established. So it is not clear that this 
response is entitled to account of HIYO-embedding (compare Woods 2017: 231f). 
However, whether or not this does in fact beg the question might depend on 
thorny issues concerning where the burden of proof lies for showing whether 
HIYO is or is not defective.  
Regardless, surely not just any candidate constitutive acceptance conditions 
will individuate a concept. Surely there must be some general constraints on 
what kind of acceptance conditions can individuate non-defective concepts. So 
even if we are entitled to assume that HIYO is non-defective, it still seems that we 
are owed some account of what makes it the case that certain conceptual roles 
individuate meaningful concepts whereas others do not. One might respond 
that all that matters is whether we could in fact use a concept according to its 
constitutive acceptance conditions. However, this would seem to reject any 
distinction between defective and non-defective concepts. In effect, this seems 
to debunk the claim that conceptual role determines content, which, as we saw, 
some see as platitudinous. The resulting view therefore seems closer to a kind 
of meaning or content scepticism. I won’t try to argue against such a view here, 
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but it seems a high price to pay for embracing conceptual role expressivism.12 
At the very least, it would be interesting if conceptual role expressivists are 
forced to adopt this kind of view.13 
 
 
4. An alternative solution 
 
Having rejected a number of responses to the challenge of defective concepts, I 
will finish by briefly sketching a line of response that I think is more promising. 
Specifically, I will argue that expressivists can answer the challenge by 
providing a non-deflationary yet non-representational determination theory for 
normative concepts. The idea is to provide some substantive account of the kind 
of content determined by normative concepts compatible with expressivism 
that rationalises their conceptual roles. Defective concepts are those for which 
no such determination theory can be given. However, as we will see, this 
approach leaves conceptual role expressivism a less interesting and distinctive 
position than it might have initially seemed. 
It is often assumed that expressivists must deny that normative attitudes 
have normative content in anything other than a deflationary sense. Implicit in 
this assumption is the thought that any substantive notion of content must be 
representational in the sense that it represents or constitutes some way reality 
might be. However, a much overlooked possibility is that expressivists adopt 
some theory of normative content that is non-representational (see Schroeder 
2013; Brown 2019). If we have some substantive notion of normative content, 
then this can play an explanatory role in an expressivist theory of normative 
concepts. Specifically, it can help to explain why conceptual roles for normative 
concepts are genuinely meaning constituting whereas those of defective 
concepts are not.  
Consider again Wedgwood’s conceptual role for OUGHT: 
 
CROUGHT S accepts the first-person proposition O<me, t>(p) ® S makes p part of 
S’s ideal plan about what to do at t. 
 
 
12 On what is essentially the view under discussion, Jared Warren writes: “unrestricted 
inferentialism has been¾as far as I am aware¾rejected by every single philosopher post-
Carnap.” (2015: 5) See op. cit. for defence, though further argument would be needed for it to 
apply at the level of mental content, given our assumption of the relative priority of thought 
over language¾see fn.8.  
13 Another possibility might be to bite the bullet and maintain that normative concepts are 
defective. For something along these lines, see Shiller (2018). 
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For Wedgwood, to accept a proposition is to accept a certain representation of 
reality as being the case. But what if there was some other way to understand 
normative propositions and what it is to accept them? For example, consider 
Gibbard’s (2003) proposal that we model the contents of normative attitudes in 
terms of the sets of plans ruled out by those attitudes. Specifically, where a 
hyperplan h specifies a maximally coherent contingency plan for what to do in 
any possible situation, the content of the proposition O<me, t>(p) can be specified 
as the set of <w, h> pairs in which p is prescribed by h in w at t.  
We then need some story about what it is to accept such a proposition. This 
story should not identify accepting O<me, t>(p) with making p part of one’s ideal 
plan. If it did, then CROUGHT would specify a transition from a mental state to 
itself and would fail to individuate a unique concept. But there are reasons for 
rejecting a straightforward identification anyway. For instance, we rely on 
normative propositions in theoretical reasoning as well as in practical reasoning, 
which is not true of our plans. And presumably it is possible to plan to do things 
against our better judgment. However this story goes, the important point is 
that the proposed semantic assignment seems to make sense of the conceptual 
role for OUGHT in a way that explains why it is non-defective. Roughly, the idea 
is that making p part of one’s plans is rational in virtue of one’s accepting <w, h> 
contents that prescribe p. Further, given our understanding of hiyo-beliefs from 
CROUGHT, we have no conception of the proposition accepted in believing that 
someone is hiyo that we could appeal to in order to explain why it is correct or 
appropriate to believe that someone is hiyo when we desire to accost them 
(modulo the complications discussed in section 3.1). So this account predicts 
that HIYO is defective because its conceptual role does not determine any kind of 
content that could be used to explain its conceptual role.14  
If we adopt this strategy for answering the challenge, however, we see that 
conceptual role expressivism becomes a less interesting position that it might 
have first appeared. For we have shifted much of the explanatory burden from 
the theory of possession conditions to the determination theory and the theory 
of normative judgment. In other words, it is no longer the conceptual role part 
of the theory that is doing the heavy lifting but our account of normative 
propositions and what it is to accept them. Where we were looking to 
conceptual role semantics to explain normative content, the bulk of the 
explanation has come from elsewhere. Nonetheless, I think this is exactly what 
 
14 One might worry that the notion of rationality employed here is normative and thus one that 
expressivists are not entitled to use in their theory of normative concepts. While I cannot argue 
the claim here, I think that expressivists should simply reject that the relevant notion of 
rationality is normative¾see Ridge (2014: chapter 8). Alternatively, however, one might instead 
attempt provide an expressivist meta-theory of conceptual role expressivism to reconcile the use 
of normative notions within the theory of normative concepts¾see Gibbard (2012).  
 22 
we should expect. This is because conceptual role expressivism is typically 
couched as a meta-semantic theory or a theory of content determination. This 
leaves open the semantic question of how we should understand the contents 
of normative concepts. This is easy to overlook because conceptual role 
expressivists tend to be deflationists about content, meaning that there is no 
explanatory role for contents. However, if we reject deflationism, then contents 
can play an explanatory role. 
As well as being less interesting, conceptual role expressivism also becomes 
less distinctive. Although expressivists might not appeal to a conceptual role 
framework to explain normative concepts, I doubt few would deny that 
normative concepts should be explained in terms of their distinctive action-
guiding role in practical deliberation. If we accept that expressivists need in 
addition some further theory of meaning or content to explain normative 
concepts, then this might seem to be compatible with a wide variety of 
expressivist theories of normative concepts. This isn’t to say that expressivists 
should not embrace conceptual role semantics. If conceptual role semantics is 
an independently attractive view of content determination, or if conceptual role 
semantics provides useful resources to formulate expressivist claims about 
normative concepts, then expressivists have every reason to embrace it. 
However, in doing so, the expressivist does not discharge the usual explanatory 





In this paper, I have examined expressivist theories that appeal to conceptual 
role accounts of content to explain normative thought. Although many 
contemporary expressivists express sympathies with conceptual role semantics, 
there is no consensus about what combining these two approaches amounts to 
and what commitments their conjunction entails. My first aim was to provide a 
fully general characterisation of conceptual role expressivism that unites these 
otherwise disparate views. Additionally, this characterisation provides a 
general framework in which expressivists can develop their theory of normative 
thought, making explicit recourse to the various choice points discussed above. 
This shows that the conceptual role framework has room for many different 
versions of conceptual role expressivism in addition to those theories discussed 
above. While I have expressed scepticism that the conceptual role framework 
alone has the resources to explain normative concepts, I have not argued that 
this cannot be a fruitful framework for expressivists.  
However, I have also argued that conceptual role expressivism cannot be the 
whole story of normative thought. Conceptual role expressivists owe us an 
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explanation of how normative conceptual roles can determine genuinely 
propositional content given commitments (A), (B), and (C). This was 
highlighted by the comparison with defective concepts like HIYO, but the point 
is a more general one. Conceptual role semantics might provide a fruitful 
framework for expressivists to develop theories of normative thought. But the 
framework itself should not be seen as the solution to any problem or set of 
problems. All the puzzling features of normative thought as conceived by 
expressivists stand in no less need of explanation once we adopt a conceptual 
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